The human and language as lines of flight from the standard image of Deleuzian ethics

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Deleuze himself defines ethics, throughout his career, with three Nietzschean themes: 1) the affirmation of intensities, through 2) the increase of what a body can do, which is itself made possible by 3) the creation of new modes of life.¹ These three ideas have become easily repeated generalities in Deleuzian and continental philosophy scholarship.² The potential of Deleuze’s ethics has thus been somewhat separated from what it can ‘do’ in our present lived situation. Initially, we can expand these themes by opening some philosophical distance between Deleuze and Nietzsche. Deleuzean ethics is fundamentally a movement of exteriorization, a connective movement, whereas Nietzschean ethics involves a fundamental movement of incorporation and appropriation.³ Deleuze thus valorizes generosity as the most basic ethical and ontological movement in the place of Nietzschean exploitation and struggle. The second way in which we can expand the standard image of Deleuzian ethics is one in which the Nietzsche comparison is in fact more instructive, but overlooked in our “posthuman(ities)” milieu: the central place of the human for Deleuze. Just as the incorporation and exploitation of forces outside the human will, Nietzsche hopes, lead to the a new form, the superman, emerging, equivalently,

¹ See, for example, the ethical selection of differential quantities in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), the ‘ethics’ of affirming intensive quantities in Difference and Repetition (1967), the ‘Ethics’ of increasing affects and powers in the Becoming chapter of A Thousand Plateaus (1980), and the interpretation of Nietzschean life-affirming ethics in Cinema 2 (1985).
² For example, Daniel W. Smith’s chapter on ethics in Essays on Deleuze (2012) does little to move outside of this reading, and in “Ethics and the ontology of freedom: problematization and responsiveness in Foucault and Deleuze” in Foucault Studies, (2014), Erinn Cunniff Gilson ends up falling back on phrases such as ‘creating new ways of living’ to explain matters such as problematization and the response, which have a crucial specificity beyond merely ‘new ways of living’.
³ See Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche on life in Cinema 2: in an almost direct quote from the Anti-Morality section of Twilight of the Idols Deleuze writes that a life-affirming ethics involves generosity and the affirmation of the lowest. If we look at the corresponding passage in Nietzschean ethics, the Nietzschean ethics involves making use of the lowest (the disgusting idiot, the priest, etc.). At the end of his Spinoza lectures in 1978, Deleuze suggests a difference such as the one being suggested here: Nietzsche is part of the movement of philosophy in which the ‘self-overcoming’ of the finite is the primary meaning of infinity, whereas today, we live in the ‘age of synthesizer’, or what he calls in the Appendix to his Foucault book, an age in which man must relate himself to an “unlimited finity,” a set of finite things which can be varied in a practically unlimited number of ways. It is this movement towards an unlimited finity as opposed to an incorporation into a movement of self-overcoming which sets Deleuze and Nietzsche apart.
Deleuze hopes that the exteriorization and movement towards forces outside the human will lead to the formation of new modes of subjectivity and individuality. The creation of new modes of individuality is never separated from the question of the human for Deleuze. The human must form a ‘block’ or a new individuality with forces outside of it. In our present age, these forces are forces of an ‘unlimited finity’. The unlimited finity is a set of finite forces which can be combined in unlimited ways. Again, this separates the contemporary situation from the Nietzschean attempt to ground a world in a finitude which disrupts infinite representation. In this characterization of Nietzschean ethics, we glimpse the centrality of representation in understanding the modes by which man relates to forces outside of him.

The concept of representation brings us to our third, perhaps most controversial, intervention in the standard image of Deleuzian ethics: that ethics must always involve an encounter with language. The reason for the centrality of language is that the human, itself at the center of any Deleuzian ethics, is essentially defined by the illusion of being able ‘shuffle’ and ‘grasp’ all the other strata (the strata being all matter with a form, all imprisoned or organized material, all captured land). This grasping and shuffling is achieved through the ability to “represent all the other strata”. This representational ability derives from the ‘translation’ which accompanies every human movement. Translation involves the unification of all the “flows, particles, codes, and territorialities” of the strata other than language into a “system of signs”. Translation is thus the “centering” and “totalization” of diverse flows by a unitary

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4 See, for example, Deleuze’s comment that seems to be a key task of A Thousand Plateaus: the nonmusical sound of the human must form a block with the becoming-sound of music.
5 We see this in the Appendix to the Foucault book also, where the concept of the unlimited finity differentiates our age from other ages in terms of what outside forces the human relates itself to.
6 See, again, the Appendix to the Foucault book, in which there is a movement from the classical age, in which representation is infinite, to the 19th century, in which finite series begin to disrupt those infinite representations, and then the modern age in which the dispersed disruptive forces of finitude begin to ‘regroup’ autonomously from any infinite representation.
7 It is worth noting at this point that the people Deleuze and Guattari call “primitives” are not human on this definition. Indeed, they say as much when they make clarifying remarks about the ‘primitives’ at the end of the Faciality chapter in which the discussion takes place: primitive people have no face, and thus they have a “primitive inhumanity” which is a “prefacial inhumanity” (A Thousand Plateaus, 190)
8 A Thousand Plateaus, 62. This is termed “translation”
9 Ibid, 62
This unification is essentially made possible because in language, a single “form” of expression (a sign) can ‘pass’ across “one or several formable substances” (the strata being represented, or the signified). However, in order for translation to occur, which is one specific possibility of language, the passage of signs through a system as opposed to something more dispersed, there must be a “single substance of expression”. Without a single substance of express for a sign to operate in, there would be no possibility of the systematization of signs; there would be the constant threat of an irregular voice disrupting the system, as in societies governed by polyvocality. The totalized semiotic “chains” of translation must be ‘protected’ from “intrusion from the outside”. This ‘protection’ of the act of translation occurs through when various “formed contents” (content being the “articulation” parallel to expression) are “translated” into a “single substance of expression”. The ‘subjugation’ of formed contents to the “exclusive form” of signifying expression means that “signifying chains” can operate with “deterritorialized, digitalized, discrete elements” without those elements threatening them.

The necessary protection of language by the translation of formed contents into the exclusive substance of signifying expression leads us to a fourth intervention in the standard image of Deleuzian ethics: the faciality machine. We must initially note that this means language cannot be the single focus of an ethical approach to connecting the human with nonhuman forces. In order for humanity to be able to ‘grasp’ and ‘shuffle’ all other beings in its pincers (translation), a non-linguistic operation is required,

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10 Translation is a specific form of overcoding, which itself is essentially defined as a unity operating in an “empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered”, giving rise to phenomena of “centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchization, and finalization” (A Thousand Plateaus, 9 and 41)
11 ibid. Translation is not merely the ability of one language to represent another language. There is in fact a specific translation which is internal to language itself, but this translation occurs through “indirect discourse,” in which there are “many” voices or murmurings (the various substances of expression, the various other linguistic elements represented), in “a” single voice (the single form of expression). (A Thousand Plateaus, 77)
12 ibid, 179
13 ibid, 200
14 ibid, 181
so that there is a “semiological screen” across which translation occurs. This extra-linguistic operation is one of “abstraction”. The abstraction of the face “connects” the organic head or brain of the human to the system of signs established by translation (“signifiance”). This abstraction makes the human into “the figure one, one and indivisible”. It is only when the human has been abstracted into an indivisible “one” that the operation of translation, which defines the human, can occur without being constantly disrupted by irregularities (love, drugs, war). In other words, regardless of the “content” one gives it, the faciality machine constitutes a facial “unit”, an “elementary” face in “biunivocal relation with another”: it is “a man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, "an x or a y." It is only through this abstraction of the human into a ‘one’, a ‘unit’, an ‘elementary’ face that translation, the passage of signs across the substance of expression, can occur. “Surveillance by the face” is thus simultaneously translation, or “overcoding,” centralization by the “signifier”. Such surveillance constitutes "Man" as “a standard in the universe,” in relation to which “men necessarily (analytically) form a majority” because they fit the standard. The faciality machine thus shows us the “the standard” of the human, by which all signifying translation is measured “white, male, adult, "rational," etc.,.” This abstract standard, perhaps, is precisely where we find an explanation for the obscure concept of the “nonmusical” sound within the human. Music is defined by continuous variation of form, as opposed to the unification of form within a standard, which would be faciality, itself is described as an “inhumanity” within the human. The injunction that “it is necessary for the nonmusical sound of the human being to form a block with the becoming-music of sound” now takes on a deeply ethical element: this nonmusic sound is in fact the face, which operates as a “deviance

15 ibid, 181
16 ibid, 178
17 ibid, 172
18 ibid, 187
19 ibid, 177
20 ibid, 117
21 ibid, 291
22 ibid, 193
23 ibid, 309
detector”, the first of which are “racial” deviances from the White Man. The necessity of a single substance of expression for the system of signs which makes us human is made possible first of all by racism: “from the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside,” and thus there is no ‘threat’ to the translation of one sign into another when it comes to representing the strata outside ‘the human’.

Of course, racism (and the abstraction of the human more generally) only ever takes place in a social space, and this brings us to the fifth and final intervention to be made in the standard image of Deleuzian ethics: the importance of resisting the State. There is a “special apparatus of power” that “triggers” the machine of faciality.24 This special apparatus is the “apparatus of capture”.25 The archaic State apparatus is the specific apparatus of capture we are interested in, as it is an “assemblage of reterritorialization” which effectuates “the overcoding machine”.26 The overcoding machine is that through which translation operates. This is why language primarily “stabilizes” around a “parish, a bishopric, a capital”.27 “Overcoding, or the Signifier” is thus the “regime of signs” of the State.28 The very “pretension” of the state is to “root” man, to make man a “legislator and subject” on its own model, through translation.29 This reveals a violence behind human language, and the homogenized humanity on which language attempts to operate: State overcoding is the “structural violence that defines the law, "police" violence”.30 It is fundamentally structural violence which allows racism and other forms of ‘deviance detection’ to take place, and for the translation of formed matter into systems of signs to operate without the threat of intrusion from outside of it. The archaic State, with this structural

24 ibid, 190
25 ibid, 444
26 ibid, 223
27 ibid, 7
28 ibid, 428
29 ibid, 45
30 ibid, 448
violence, fundamentally operates by a “machine of enslavement”.\textsuperscript{31} Resisting such violent enslavement which makes smooth, totalized representation in language possible, can itself make possible disruptions of the rigid systems of meaning which ‘bind’ us as humans.

Whilst the standard image of Deleuzian ethics is certainly in line with what Deleuze says about his own position and should not be left aside, I hope to have shown that abstract discussion of ‘affects’ and ‘creating new ways of living’ are insufficient on their own to really act in a Deleuzian manner. We have suggested that ethical action must always begin with the human, and that the most general definition of the human involves translation of formed materials into systems of signs. We have also suggested that this movement of translation can only operate successfully in a world in which there is an abstract humanity which can act as a standard. This abstract standard is necessarily upheld by structural violence, as part of a more general regime of enslavement of the human being. All of these suggestions offer ethical foci, the central points around which resistance can occur and new connections with nonhuman forces must be made. This would then make possible escape routes from the present and the genuine affirmation of new modes of life.

\textsuperscript{31} ibid, 459
Deleuze’s Political Ethics: “A Fascism of the New?” and Other Questions

Fred Evans

Political ethics concerns the “dramatization” of voices: which are heard, which not, and how they are expressed and received. The scope of this ethics is infinite for Deleuze because everything for him is a voice: Being is the “single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple … a single clamour of Being for all beings.” Indeed, Being’s “univocal meaning” is nothing more than the continual division of itself into the clamorous progeny apart from which it does not exist. This characterization of Being implies that an ethics pertinent to its creative activity cannot consist in obedience to an imperative or other source that transcends it. In positive terms, this ethics can only be an immanent expression of its vocal setting, an amor fati. Indeed, Deleuze says that the adherence of these voices to any moral principle transcending them would separate them from what they can do and thereby weaken them and their audibility. In other words, such compliance would amount to the antithesis of ethics, to the “morality” of constraining rules.

We can be more precise about this ethics by clarifying the reality to which we and all beings are “fated” and how our “love” of this domain is expressed and often suppressed. To gain this clarity, we must first note Deleuze’s characterization of reality as “chaosmos”: the cosmos is neither series that converge on one another (never a teleological or mechanistic order, never the result of sameness) nor series that diverge from each other without any possible “communication” among them (never pure chaos); rather, chaosmos consists in series that diverge from each other but nevertheless communicate with one another. This communication, however, does not make actual a predetermined order. Instead, it produces what would undermine any such regime, a new difference or singularity, and is thus a “composed chaos” or a cosmos that is an anti-cosmos, an order that is an anti-order. This indicates that the constellation of voices in the Deleuzian avowal of amor fati embodies what we can call three ethico-political virtues: solidarity (interconnectedness of the series or voices), heterogeneity (the singularity or difference of each of these entities), and fecundity (the production of new differences). Because the first of these three virtues, (non-homogeneous) solidarity, is often understated by commentators in relation to Deleuze’s ethics, we should note the sort of interconnections Deleuze has in mind: “What we are talking about is not the unity of substance but the infinity of the modifications that are part of one another on this unique plane of life.” The words I have italicized suggest that each “part” or series, also referred to as “multiplicity” or “assemblage” (agencement), of the cosmos is part of the (always varying) identity of the rest and at the same time their “other.” Deleuze’s political ethics, then, implies a tri-parte affirmation or “crowned anarchy” and is completely immanent to the realm of interconnected voices, an expression of them and their interrelatedness.

If this love of chaosmos is to qualify as the broadest meaning of Deleuze’s idea of ethics, it must be congruent with the more particular descriptions he gives of ethical activity. He sometimes refers to his ethics as “ethology” because it concerns the “latitude” of the “haecceities” (“intensities”) on “the plane of consistency” or “virtual” and productive dimension of any assemblage. More specifically, the notion of latitude refers to the “affects of which [an haecceity] is capable,” that is, its capacity to affect or be affected by other haecceities and thus to
form the new individuals and, via “reterritorialization,” the highly ordered form they take on the plane of organization for the same assemblage (event or becoming). These affects constitute the “power” of any being. If one being separates another from its affects, the power of the passively affected being, its abilities, are reduced and thereby now constitute what is ethically bad and “saddening” for it. If the contrary takes place, if a being actively links up with another being in a dramatization that increases its power, this is ethically good, indeed, “joyful.”

If we are speaking of ethical goodness with respect to nature and not just the alloplastic or human stratum, then the power relations must be such that the voices on the plane of consistency affirm each other (solidarity), their status as differences or singularities (heterogeneity), and the interaction among them that produces of new voices (assemblages or events). We can skip to the alloplastic or human stratum in order to show how this triple affirmation or political ethics might be dramatized. This stratum is similar to the inorganic and organic strata in that they all “express” their affects. But in the alloplastic stratum expression has priority over content because of its “spontaneity” and has the added capacity of being able to use language for speaking scientifically, poetically, and in other linguistic genres about all the strata.

We who enunciate alloplastic expression do so only as part of the “constellation of voices” that makes up the “molecular” or “unconscious” “collective assemblage of enunciation” (a dimension, along with the related “machinic assemblage of bodies,” of the overall assemblage). For example, when we are teaching our classes we are enunciating the professor’s voice, a discourse which precedes us and to which we conform in carrying out our profession. The constellation and other aspects of assemblage are “guided” by the diagram of the abstract machine for the assemblage. We might say that the abstract machine is the lead voice of the others in the constellation and that those others resound within it. All abstract machines, furthermore, are interrelated or “shot through” with each other; each, we might repeat once more in light of Deleuze’s idea of enveloping “parts” introduced above, is part of the evanescent identity the rest and at the same time their other. Thus the valorization of any one of these voices is the immediate affirmation of all of them and at the same time of their differences, of each singular node on their shared “line of infinite variation.” This valorization also includes their fecundity or production of new voices through their dynamic interrelationship or “communication.”

How do these voices express their power, their active affects? Given all that we have said about reality as chaomos and its ethics of amor fati, ‘power’ here can only mean linking up to other beings-as-haecceities in a way that increases the power of all, that is, at one and the same time augments their togetherness or solidarity, the singularity or difference of each, and the fecundity of their interaction with each other. Although these voices are interrelated, singular, and productive, Deleuze indicates that the symbiotic and agonistic relation between the plane of consistency and the plane of organization can lead to fascism or other lines of self-abolition just as readily as to a line of infinite variation or metamorphosis, to negative modes of relative deterritorialization or “conjugation” as well as to positive absolute deterritorialization or “connection.” Political ethics, then, has both a negating and an affirmative side. The former consists in resisting these nihilistic tendencies and, more generally, the “organism, signification and interpretation, subjectification and subjection” that “together” are “what separates us from the plane of consistency and the abstract machine,” that is, from our affects or power.
affirmative side consists in valorizing the three political virtues of solidarity, heterogeneity, and fecundity, in short, “chaosmos.” In *Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that this valorization involves becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible and ultimately, becoming-everybody/everything. In other words, the full thrust of this valorization takes place when everyone is at once resisting the nihilistic “majoritarianism” and affirming the “minoritarian” interconnectedness of everything, difference of each thing, and creation of new things through this becoming other. In our age, it means overcoming the conjugations of the molar and supple lines and lines of flight that make up the capitalist axiomatic and contributing to the connecting of these same lines in revolutions that will allow the emergence of “a new Land,” “a new earth and people that do not yet exist.”

But this characterization leads to at least three problems within Deleuze’s characterization of ethics that must be discussed:

1) Smith, Patton, and others have identified Deleuzian ethics as the “production of the new.” Does this emphasis on “the new” by itself imply that either or both Deleuzian (non-homogeneous) solidarity and difference can be sacrificed on the altar of the new, the other two ethico-political virtues reduced to a mere means for producing it? Does this amount to Deleuze’s idea of fascism, a line of abolition of itself and everything, the sort also whimsically championed by “The Futurist” artists as part of Mussolini’s ethics and political philosophy, or to the notions of a pure capitalist line of variation that might avoid complete axiomatization without annihilating itself in the process of endlessly creating new sources of profits and the exploitation of others? Or can we claim that politically ethical action must and can augment the power of interconnection (solidarity) and heterogeneity as well as that of creating the new, without sacrificing one for the other? What sort of dramatization or conditions – which “who? how much? how? where? when?” – would constitute this triple affirmation at once?

2) If “we” are anonymous haecceities or voices on the plane of consistency and externally conditioned entities on the plane of organization, are we then powerless to play a role in our destiny (separation from our active affects), that is, in our relation to capitalism and the other assemblages in which we are involved? Is there an “I” or “we” that encompasses and is more than the anonymous “I” or “we” and the externally conditioned “I” or “we” – is there an “I” or “we” that is somehow anonymous and personal at once and thereby plays at least an elliptical role in its destiny, in its production of a “new people, new world”?

3) Although this requires more elaboration, is Deleuze’s immanent dramatization of political ethics superior to Derrida’s presumably transcendent dramatization of “pure ethics” – does the unconditionality or proclaimed impossibility of the injunction of “democracy to come” separate us from our active democratic affects as Smith suggests?


3 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 149.


6 Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 254 – the full quote is “The plane of consistency of Nature is like an immense Abstract Machine . . . its pieces are the various assemblages and individuals, each of which groups together an infinity of particles entering into an infinity of more or less interconnected relations. . . . What we are talking about is not the unity of substance but the infinity of the modifications that are part of one another [qui sont parties les unes des autres] on this unique plane of life” (my italics and inclusion of the French). The meaning of the other terms in this quote will be introduced below. For more on interconnectivity or Mechanosphere,” what I am here calling “solidarity,” see Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 255, 256, 514; Logic of Sense, 56, 60, 64, 78-79.

7 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 36-37, 41.


9 See Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) for the priority that the “spontaneity” or conditioning power of language and “statements” (expression) give it over the determinable “visible” realm (content) despite the relation of “reciprocal presupposition” between the two (67-68). This spontaneity is also the case for genetic and other languages or “refrains” on the organic stratum and very possibly for the form of expression on the inorganic stratum as well.

10 See Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 62, for the “superlinearity” of language and 91, 142 for the piloting role of the abstract machine and its diagram for the assemblage.
See Deleuze and Guattari, ibid., for speaking of “all manner of voices in a voice” (77, 80, 3), for the idea of drawing our own voice from the “constellation of voices” (84), and for the general relation of the collective assemblage of enunciation to the machinic assemblage of bodies and the assemblage as a whole, including its abstract machine and diagram (140-143).

See Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, 91, 142 for the piloting role of the abstract machine and its diagram for the assemblage.


See Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, for the symbiotic but oppositional relation between the plane of consistency and the plane of organization (269-270), the priority of absolute over relative deterritorialization (56, 508-10), the opposition between “connection” and “conjugation” (*conjugaison*, sometimes mistranslated as “conjunction,” see 510) (220, 473, 508-10), and fascism, disgust, drug abuse, and other lines of self-abolition or nihilism (230-31, 215, 227, 285-86, 508-10).

Ibid., 134.

Ibid., 470; see also 200, 249-52, 279, 280.

Ibid., 105-106: “Continuous variation constitutes the becoming-minoritarian of everybody, as opposed to the majoritarian Fact of Nobody.”

Ibid., 472-73, 509-10.


Smith, “Place of Ethics,” 159; Dan Smith, “The Conditions of the New,” in Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 255: “the new (difference) . . . [is] the primary determination of Being itself” (255). See also Dan Smith, “Patton: Normativity, Freedom, and Judgment,” in Smith, Essays on Deleuze, where Smith equates Paul Patton’s Deleuze-derived ethical-politico idea of “critical freedom” with “the exercise of a judgment, outside of pre-existing rules, which would be productive of the new” (the creation of rights, the creation and transformation of social imaginaries, the production of new space-times, etc.) (359-60; 350). However, in his own statement of his position, Patton also mentions that the normative or ethical commitments of Deleuze’s ontology includes “a world understood as a complex of interconnected assemblages” but then goes on to say that the “overriding norm is that of deterritorialization,” making Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy “utopian in the sense that it opens up the possibility of new forms of individual and collective identity, thereby effecting the absolute deterritorialization of the present in thought” (Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (New York: Routledge, 2000), 9. See also Eugene W. Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), who does emphasize interconnectivity and states that the “ethical criterion” “is always a question of whether a given becoming augments our ability to act and our mutual enjoyment of affecting and being affected by others” (114; see also 127, 136-37).

Deleuze, “Method of Dramatization,” 94. For a fuller discussion of this political issue, see Evans, “Deleuze, Bakhtin and the ‘Clamour of Voices’,” *Deleuze Studies*, 178-200.

For a fuller discussion of this issue concerning Deleuze on identity and agency, see Evans, Multivoiced Body, 53-56, and “Deleuze, Bakhtin, and the ‘Clamour of Voices’,” 193-95.

63). For the view that Derrida’s position is also a philosophy of immanence (a “contaminated immanence” to Deleuze’s “impure transcendence”), see, in the same volume, Leonard Lawlor, “The Beginnings of Thought: The Fundamental Experience in Derrida and Deleuze,” 86.
Workshop ‘Deleuze: Ethics and Dramatization’
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Of Immanence and Becoming, Or Ideas and Concepts: Philosophy as Ethico-Onto-Epistemology

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We distinguish Ideas, concepts and dramas:
the role of dramas is to specify concepts by incarnating
the differential relations and singularities of an Idea.¹

1. In this short intervention I would like to connect the theme of the workshop with some
aspects of my engagement of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference as ethics of becoming
(e.g. Thiele 2008) and my current interest in ‘radically immanent’ relational ontologies. I
want to contribute to our discussion by focusing on the specific quality of the ‘passage’ from
the idea of ‘immanence’ to the concept of ‘becoming’ that I see as central to the
understanding of what ‘radical immanence’ means in Deleuze and Guattari.²

Rereading Deleuze’s ‘Method of Dramatization’ in conjunction with Deleuze and Guattari’s
last collaboration What is Philosophy? (via Gasché’s most recent book Geophilosophy: On
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s What is Philosophy? (2014)), I once more realized
the significance of the process of different/ciation between idea(s) and concept(s) also for my
ethical interest. I hope to be able to show in this short paper that this differential relation both
implies the ethical dimension that I ascribe to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical work
(though an ethicity that can only ever be ‘minor’, i.e. no morality or Ethics (capital E)), and
therefore introduces a difference in what it means ‘to do philosophy’. I hope to explicate
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical ‘doing’ as ethico-onto-epistemology, in which all
vectors – ethics, epistemology and ontology – become undone.³

2. “Ideas are multiplicities: every idea is a multiplicity or a variety” (Deleuze 1994, 182),
Deleuze writes in Difference and Repetition. And in ‘The Method of Dramatization’ he

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¹ Deleuze 1994, 218.
² If this is a legitimate use of immanence and becoming (as idea and concept) is also something that I want to
put up for discussion here. While I feel safe to use them thus in the context of ‘Method of
Dramatization’/Difference and Repetition, it is a different matter when it comes to What is Philosophy?.
³ Ethico-onto-epistemology is introduced by Barad in Meeting the Universe Halfway (Barad 2007).
specifies that when the Idea is approached as a multiplicity it means to not begin by assuming it as given in simple essence (Platonism), which then (secondarily) is represented imperfectly in the actual (or ‘inessential’), but “to have the inessential include the essential. But the inessential includes the essential only in case…” This procedure is totally different from that of contra-diction and can be called vice-diction” (Deleuze 2004, 96). In his discussion of Deleuze’s ‘Immanent Ethics’, Bogue defines the process of vice-diction as one “whereby one identifies and engages the virtual events immanent within one’s present world, whereby one ‘counter-actualizes’ the virtual” (Bogue 2007, 9). Therefore, instead of opposing One to All so that every individual realization is both a part of One and precisely not-One; or to say it differently, instead of approaching multiplicity within the dialectics of multiple and one, when it comes to radical immanence something else is needed: we have to envision a more intimate relation between the virtual and the actual, more intimate than the opposing forces of contra-diction, and yet – at the same time – we need to stress that something always has to happen – an event of (counter-)actualization as differentiation so that anything comes into existence at all. Actualization is neither mere realization nor is it taking place (from) within the logic of representation (dialectics) – it is a (dis)continuous process of becoming.4

3. While everything seems to be sufficiently spelled out thus, this short exposition still echoes too much a separating or severing of space(s) between the virtual and the actual, and thus it harbors the danger that the virtual (or the Idea) in Deleuze (and Guattari) is understood as the realm behind the actual, a totality (however open) from which the actual merely emerges, or a (quasi-transcendental) condition of or for the actual.5 Such philosophically recognizable ‘translations’, however, limit what seems to be the most refreshing (but also intricate) point in Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) the commitment to radical immanence. It is at this moment that the specificity of the idea of immanence becomes so significant and in need to be attended to in detail. When engaging with immanence in Deleuze (and Guattari), we notice that immanence in their work(s) figures doubly: on the one hand, as a specific philosophical idea that is favored and their aim is to develop this idea in their philosophy, and on the other hand (to be read as ‘at the very same time’) immanence is that which guides the whole undertaking

4 “A very important aspect of the notion of multiplicity is the way in which it is distinguished from a theory of the One and the Multiple. The notion of multiplicity saves us from thinking in terms of ›One and Multiple‹. There are many theories in philosophy that combine the one and the multiple. They share the characteristic of claiming to reconstruct the real with general ideas. We are told that the Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis), then it is the unity of the multiple (synthesis).” (Deleuze 2002, 44)

5 This linguistic/conceptual ‘translation’ seems to me to happen in the otherwise excellent presentations of the problem in Gasché (2014) and in MacKenzie/Porter (2011).
to begin with. Therefore, is the idea of immanence (as multiplicity) not set up in this philosophy as the ‘diffractive/-ing apparatus’ that entangles (verschränkt) the ‘what’ that is in question with the ‘how’, i.e. the way in which it is processed, so that immanence becomes both the process via which the plane of immanence is ‘created’ (or ‘cut’) and the very result of the process, i.e. the appropriate thought of immanence that only ever makes concepts into ‘proper’ philosophical concepts?6

Immanence as multiplicity in the Deleuzian (and Guattarian) sense, I want to argue, is always/already folded upon itself. And it is only this way, as Deleuze and Guattari forcefully argue in What is Philosophy?, that immanence is no longer “immanent to something like a ‘dative,’ Matter or Mind”, but is “only immanent to itself”, capturing “everything, absorb[ing] All-One, and leav[ing] nothing remaining to which it could be immanent” (Deleuze/Guattari 1994, 45-48).

4. Flattening without collapsing, entangling or intra-weaving the relation of the virtual and the actual so ‘radically’ – this is what is asked for in order to get (to) the specific dynamisms that Deleuze is already defining in ‘The Method of Dramatization’ as characterizing (dramatizing) the relation or passage between idea/virtual and concept/actual in his philosophy. This flattening as entangling is also asked for in order to become aware of the inherent relation of thinking and acting within the Deleuzian (and Guattarian) philosophical theatre that expresses their inherent ethos of philosophizing. And it is (again) via the very specificity of a concept – becoming –, different/ciating (itself from) immanence as idea/multiplicity, that this aspect of ‘doing philosophy’ can be best exemplified.

If immanence is the idea that in Deleuzian terms ‘poses a problem’ (rather than representing ‘the Truth’), and is, therefore, in need of a solution, in need to find a productive line of flight, it is the concept of becoming in its (heterogeneous) consistency (onto-epistemologically as passage from virtual to actual and incarnated in the becoming-series / ethico-politically as a

6 This is much too densely presented in these few sentences. But what I aim at here is to read Deleuze (and Guattari’s) radical immanence together with the quantum philosophy of Barad, as she has developed it since Meeting the Universe Halfway (Barad 2007). In her work, the quantum understanding of diffraction (Niels Bohr) plays a crucial role in how to do philosophy as onto-epistemology. The Deleuzian/Guattarian idea of immanence, ‘acting’ both as the plane of immanence ‘on which’ concepts are created and as that which is itself only ever ‘made’ in this process of creation/cutting, seems to me best approached in such quantized manner. Only in this way do we avoid reintroducing transcendence into ‘radical immanence’. The Deleuze/Guattarian plane of immanence, ‘cut’/created from-with-in the immanent process of different/ciation, seems to also resonate strongly with what Barad describes as ‘cutting-together-apart’ (Barad 2010). In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari specify the creation of the plane of immanence as a ‘cut through chaos’, but they also emphasize the procedure of ‘selection’ thereby (cf. Deleuze/Guattari 1994, 44-50). To say it again also in Baradian terminology – it will always matter which cuts are made and even the smallest cuts matter (cf. Barad 2007, 384).
creative ‘imperative’ – ‘to become’, ‘to create a Body without Organs’) that complements and is inseparable from the thought of ‘radical immanence’. Or, to borrow words from Mackenzie and Porter’s discussion of ‘Dramatization as Method in Political Theory’, becoming “brings to life” immanence (Mackenzie/Porter 2011, 483). As is well known, and Deleuze and Guattari present it thus specifically in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze/Guattari 2000), ‘becoming’ in their philosophy is not about representing or imitating an idea given in essence. Rather, becoming is only ever the movement itself. It is actualizing (the plane of) immanence as different/ciating (from) it, and thus it is only ever conceivable as a ‘what’ when intrinsically linked to the ‘how to’ – i.e. how to become-woman, for whom, when, in what ways, in which cases, and how much so. We are then again back with ‘The Method of Dramatization’ and are able to read together Deleuze’s statement that “‘multiplicity,’ when used as a substantive, designates a domain where the Idea, of itself, is much closer to the accident than to the abstract essence, and can be determined only with the question who? how? how much? where and when? in which case?” (Deleuze 2004, 96) and the provocative passage from the *A Thousand Plateaus* in which it is said: “…So experiment. That’s easy to say? Although there is no preformed logical order to becomings and multiplicities, there are criteria, and the important thing is that they not be used after the fact, that they be applied in the course of events, that they be sufficient to guide us through the dangers” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000, 251).

5. So, what is it then that I see as the specific significance – in the ethico-onto-epistemological sense – of the passage between idea and concept, the virtual and actual, immanence and becoming that makes a difference in Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) philosophizing? Instead of a thought that is based on Truth(s) (logos), theirs is one of Critique (dramatization), in which it is not the finding or discovering of essences that are the incentives to do philosophy but the problematizing and providing of a solution to the posed problem (and there always is one), without ever envisioning an end to the immanent processes of becoming itself. And if concepts and ideas in Deleuze (and Guattari) are also a matter of specific consistency, and the passage from idea to concept is one of different/ciation as intensification (and precisely not one of the good or bad copy (Platonism)), then it can be argued that the thought of radical immanence – immanent to nothing but itself – neither saves

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7 To remember that ‘consistency’ – in the sense of “‘holding together’ of heterogeneous elements” (Deleuze/Guattari 2000, 323) – is of great importance in respect to concept/idea/plane, I owe to Len Lawlor and his lectures on *A Thousand Plateaus* that I was able to attend at Penn State University in the Spring Semester 2014.
us from the terran/earthly condition of ‘partiality’ in every singular/actualized mode,\textsuperscript{8} nor does it foreclose the possibility of real change and transformation of current conditions. Given that (counter-)actualizations always only ever ‘cut’ the plane that at the same time extends them into spacetimemattering, \textit{change/becoming is all there is}. In a Nietzschean sense, philosophy as such an affirmative critical attitude (\textit{ethos}) entangles thought and life, and reminds us that “[m]odes of life inspire ways of thinking; modes of thinking create ways of living. Life \textit{activates} thought, and thought \textit{affirms} life” (Deleuze 2001, 66).

6. From there it is important to stress that the concept of becoming as incarnation/actualization of the virtual/idea of immanence ‘ends’ as becoming-imperceptible in the becoming-series of \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}. While so easily misunderstood as an attempt to celebrate absolute deterritorialization (and thereby misconstruing the – again – intricately entangled relation between de- and re- in Deleuze and Guattari), the authors of \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} actually give a definition of what is meant here. They specify becoming-imperceptible as “the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula” in as much as a “becoming everybody/everything (\textit{tout le monde})” which is nothing but “to world (\textit{faire monde}), to make a world (\textit{faire un monde})” (Deleuze/Guattari 2000, 279-280). And that this does not mean merely not doing anything, they also say explicitly: “Not everybody becomes everybody [and everything: \textit{tout le monde} – Trans.], makes a becoming of everybody/everything. This requires much asceticism, much sobriety, much creative involution…For everybody/everything is the molar aggregate, but \textit{becoming everybody/everything} is another affair, one that brings into play the cosmos with its molecular components. (Deleuze/Guattari 2000, 279-280)

Philosophy as ethico-onto-epistemology devotes itself to this emphasis on the immanent end of becoming as ‘worlding’ in which to “saturate every atom” (Deleuze/Guattari 2000, 280 and 329) is the consistency aimed at, thereby transforming the boundaries of what classically is separated as ‘to be’ (ontology), ‘to know’ (epistemology) and ‘to act/do’ (ethics), and bringing to life the complex entangledness of the plane of immanence as an immanence immanent only to itself.

\textsuperscript{8} Understood in the sense Donna Haraway gave to ‘partiality’, in which it is not meant as merely incarnating a ‘particular’ standpoint (additive sense), but achieving a position of “partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology” (Haraway 1988, 584).
Bibliography


Only Die Micrologically! A Note on Drama and Ethics in Deleuze

In the discussion portion of the 1967 text called “The Method of Dramatization,”\(^1\) Maurice de Gandillac asks Deleuze why he uses the word “dramatization” to translate the dynamisms he had described in the presentation (DIS 151/108). Deleuze responds by saying that he is trying to replace the *logos* with a drama, and then he provides examples from psychoanalysis and from the Wurtzburg School of psychology, examples such as madness, falling asleep, and anger. Yet, in “The Method of Dramatization,” it is difficult to find anticipations of such examples. In fact, the article concerns the conditions of the *logos* (conditions of essences), conditions discovered in ideas, which are themselves defined by the dynamisms of intensive depth (*profondeur*). More drily, the article relies on the differential calculus and Leibniz to determine this indeterminate depth. Thus, like Gandillac, I found myself asking *where the drama is* in “The Method of Dramatization”? The article could not be less dramatic. “The Method of Dramatization” tells us nothing about action. Thus, since, by definition, drama must present actions, indeed, since drama must *be* action, we could say that the dramatic question we are posing is fundamentally an ethical question. This short essay, really, no more than a note, attempts to find an answer to this ethics-drama question of action. It remains within the context of Deleuze’s 1968 *Difference and Repetition*, but I will suggest at the end that the 1980 collaborative work, *A Thousand Plateaus*, presents much the same answer.\(^2\) As we shall see, the answer involves two contradictory principles.

In order to start to find an answer to our ethics-drama question, we must turn to the 1968 *Difference and Repetition*.\(^3\) In Chapter Four, “Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference,” Deleuze takes up the idea of dramatization much as he had done in “The Method of Dramatization.” Yet, in *Difference and Repetition*, dramatization appears only at the completion of Chapter Four,
when Deleuze turns to the actualization of ideas in the things themselves (DR 276/214). Ideas actualize themselves or incarnate themselves in spatio-temporal dynamisms. As Deleuze says in *Difference and Repetition*, the spatio-temporal dynamisms “are precisely dramas, they dramatize the Idea” (DR 279/216, Deleuze’s emphasis). Of course, it is in these final pages of Chapter Four that Deleuze invokes Artaud’s theater of cruelty, as he had also done in “The Method of Dramatization.” Yet, we learn how ideas are actualized only in Chapter Five, “The Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible.” Dramatization concerns the “aesthetical side” of the idea, while, it seems, (focusing only on the ideal conditions of concepts) “The Method of Dramatization” and *Difference and Repetition* Chapter Four concerns the “dialectical side” of the idea (DR 285/221, also, 315/244). In Chapter Five, we learn that the aesthetical side of the idea (taking the word “aesthetics” in its more literal sense) is the intensity of a sensation. As Deleuze says, “It is intensity which dramatizes” (DR 316/245). Indeed, if the fifth chapter truly presents dramatization, then dramatization appears when Chapter Five presents “an ethics of intensive quantities” (DR 314/244).

What is intensity? For Deleuze, intensity is what lies beneath in the depth below extension (or quantity) and qualities. Therefore, we must never confuse intensity with “the twofold distinctive trait” of a thing in general: extensity and quality (DIS 134/96). To help us avoid this confusion, Deleuze provides three characteristics of intensity (DR 299/232). The first characteristic is this: while intensity is always quantitative, “intensive quantity includes the unequal in itself” (DR 299/232). Intensity represents what cannot be cancelled in quantitative difference or made equal to qualities. At the beginning of the fifth chapter Deleuze presents a sort of divine creation story. Deleuze speaks about God creating the world on the basis of a calculation that never quite works out “exactly *[juste]*” (DR 286/222). Because God’s
calculations are not quite right or just, it is as if the world contains a fundamental and irreducible injustice or it is as if time is always out of joint. This is a strange creation story but Deleuze’s mention of God’s unjust calculation is important. Deleuze is suggesting that God had used a ratio to create the world, say, a ratio between space and time or between quantity and quality. However, because this calculation was inexact (*pas juste*), the ratio is asymmetrical, or we have to say that this ratio always results in an irrational number. The world then created from this irrational ratio, Deleuze says, is a “remainder,” that is, a quantity that cannot be completely resolved into an integer or a whole number. Thus, for Deleuze, intensive quantity is not a species of the genus quantity (DR 299/232). Instead, as an irreducible inequality, intensity is, so to speak, “the quality of quantity,” the fundamental or original moment present in every quantity. Of course, as Deleuze points out, the irreducible remainder of an irrational number tends to subordinate its inequality arithmetically to a limit-equality indicated by the convergent series of rational numbers. Irrational numbers of course can be rounded up to the next largest whole number. Nevertheless, what we discover here (and we shall return to this distinction in a moment, in the third characteristic) is the duality between intensity and extensity and the duality between explication and implication. An irrational number “cancels” its difference by explicating the difference within the extensive order it institutes. Nevertheless, it maintains this difference in itself in the implicated order by which it is “grounded” (*fondé*). In other words, the difference or inequality is still there beneath the extension and the quality, still there in the depth (*profondeur*). So, we can see here in this first characteristic of intensity that intensity includes two poles – like an X and a Y axis – that cannot be made equal to one another, the result being that there is always a remainder in every attempt to measure one against the other. The remainder, in other
words, remains still implicated – even though the ratio between the X and the Y – the difference between them -- can be explicated (or cancelled) in extensity and in equal qualities.

As Deleuze says, “a second characteristic flows from the first: since it is already difference in itself and involves inequality as such, intensity affirms difference” (DR 301/234, Deleuze’s emphasis). In other words, since intensity necessarily includes difference, it refers to a series of other differences. Then if it affirms itself, intensity necessarily affirms all the other differences, including the lowest one in the series. Deleuze provides images of this affirmation: the descent of the eagle’s flight and the descent of water in a waterfall. The images imply that tension is experienced as a fall. It is experienced as a fall or descent because intensity is defined (by Kant) as the instantaneous apprehension of a magnitude.

The plurality apprehended in this multitude could only be represented by its approximation to negation = 0. Consequently we can experience an ascent only by its approximation to zero. The whole problem lies in the conception of this zero. In fact, and importantly, the zero is not nothingness. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze stresses that high and low are only manners of speaking. What is at issue is “depth and … the lower depth that belongs to it essentially” (DR 302/234). Although the zero is not nothingness – and, as in “The Method of Dramatization,” Deleuze utilizes the calculus to support this claim (DR 222-23/171-72) – we still might that it is really nothingness. We might think the zero is nothingness if we look at the heights from below. From the lower perspective, the highest intensities look like life, while the lower or degraded viewpoint itself, the zero, looks like death. Indeed, it is from this reversed viewpoint, according to Deleuze, that negation emerges (DR 303/235). Therefore, in order to reverse the viewpoint back to the higher, the essential necessity of affirming the series of differences included in intensity must become an ethical necessity. Deleuze expresses the ethical necessity through the common French idiom of “il faut” (DR
302/234): “il faut la puissance d’une Cascade ou d’une chute profonde pour aller jusque-là, pour faire de la dégradation même une affirmation.” More simply, and this is the first rule of an ethics of intensive quantities, we can say: “Affirm even the lowest!”

The second rule of Deleuze’s ethics of intensive quantities appears in the third characteristic of intensity. Deleuze states that the third characteristic summarizes the first two. The third characteristic summarizes the first two because the third concerns priority. Here is the third characteristic: “intensity is an implicated, enveloped, or ‘embryonized’ quantity…. Intensity is primarily implicated in itself: implicating and implicated” (DR 305/237, my emphasis). Primarily and really, intensity implicates and envelops difference. As we saw, intensity always refers to a series of differences all the way down to what looks like but is not zero. The implicating and enveloping differences are what lie beneath qualities and differences in kind. Primarily and really, intensity has implicated and enveloped distance. As we saw, intensity lies beneath extensity; it is depth, which is itself composed of distances. Thus, secondarily and apparently, quantity reacts upon its cause, intensity, and tends to cancel difference in extension. As well, secondarily and apparently, extensity explicates difference and cancels difference within a quality (DR 314/243). The second rule of the ethics of intensive quantities arises from the secondary process of explication and cancellation. As Deleuze says, “The hard law of explication is that what is explicated is explicated once and for all. The ethics of intensive quantities has only two principles: affirm even the lowest, do not explicate oneself (too much)” (DR 314/244, Deleuze’s emphasis).

Immediately, we can see the tension between these two ethical principles. Indeed, the two principles amount to contradictory demands. On the one hand, the first principle of affirmation is a superlative: affirm even the lowest, affirm the fall, go all the way down to zero. On the other
hand, the principle of explication is a comparative: do not explicate yourself too much, keep something in reserve, don’t equalize the remainder. The use of these two contradictory principles requires an art (DR 315/245). It is this art that makes the actions of intensity dramatic. At issue with these two contradictory principles is death and love. What is going to happen? Will he go all the way down to zero and explicate all the distances and differences of a life; or will he keep just enough implicated so that there is still something leftover to live for? Will he love her so much that the possible world implicated in her is cancelled? Affirming even the lowest amounts to risking one’s life in order to make the distances and differences of intensity be experienced, but don’t go all the way to the end of intensity, to nothingness, to self-destruction (DR333/259). Explicating another amounts to making the possible world contained in the other be experienced, but don’t explicate the other so much that the other’s face is cancelled in a quality and her landscape cancelled in an extension (DR 334-335/260-261). In short, always keep enough of the remainder even as you let it slip through your hands!

We know that Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateau are very different books. Yet, A Thousand Plateaus contains these same two contradictory ethical principles. We see the principles in Plateau Six, which takes up of course Artaud’s idea of a body without organs. Yet, Plateau Six concerns precisely the actions required to “make” a body without organs. Plateau Six commands of us to make ourselves a body without organs. And to do so, one must first unmake the organs, in order to expose the body as a space of intensities. The body without organs is defined as a matrix of intensity where intensity = zero (MP 189-190/153). Thus, as we saw in Difference and Repetition, to make a body without organs we must affirm the lowest. Yet, once again, we must not go all the way down to nothingness: “You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn” (MP 199/160). In other words, to make a
body without organs you have to affirm the lowest zero, you have to experiment and risk your life, try to explicate all those differences and intensities bottled up in molar extensions and major qualities. But, you must not explicate so much – “il faut en garder assez” – not so much that you have nothing left over, not so much that you destroy yourself. So, to conclude and summarize, we could say that Deleuze’s ethics amounts to a negative imperative of don’t commit suicide, and a positive imperative of only die micrologically!

Leonard Lawlor

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Dramatizing our concepts implies, according to Deleuze, to stop thinking in terms of *what is this?* in favor of more dramatic – more situated – terms such as *who, how much, how, where, when* (2004: 94). In this paper, I will focus on the *who* term: who is the subject of the dramatization, who can do, or at least undergo, dramatization process? Deleuze writes it clearly: the subjects of dramatization are embryonic or larval, because “they alone are capable of sustaining the lines, the slippages and the rotations” (1994: 219) proper to spatiotemporal dynamisms which make up dramatization. One can think of the dreamer, who experiences forces that he could not stand awake, or of the embryo itself, which undergoes pressures and torsions that would be unbearable for an already constituted adult. In theatrical words, the stage of dramatization is populated “with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters” (1994: 10). By describing such strange “subjects”, Deleuze not only insists on the genetic, supra-conceptual and sub-representative components of dramatization. He also fights any misunderstanding that would look for a psychology or anthroplogy in the drama of ideas since this drama is not “privileging mankind in any way” (2004: 114).

Here, we encounter one difficulty: if the subjects of dramatization are unlike any kind of normalized anthropological figures, how can they concern our thought – and our ethics of thought – in any way? I will argue that answering this question requires that we wonder about the function of what Deleuze could call an ethics of the marionette – a category which, in the frame of this paper, will embrace puppets, mechanical dolls, automata, mimes and mummies. Although very discreet, the “marionette theme” is recurrent in Deleuze’s work, especially in the eighties. Take for example the introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus*, in which the puppet-puppeteer assemblage is presented as a heterogeneous rhizome creating an abstract puppet beyond human/non-human divisions.¹ Considering Deleuze’s great admiration for the writings of Heinrich von Kleist, it is highly probable that the marionette theme is inspired by one of the German writer’s most famous texts: *On The Marionette Theatre* (the text itself is mentioned several times in *A Thousand Plateaus* and other related pieces).²

But at first reading, Kleist’s text takes us deeper into the mystery of the ethics of marionette, and does not make things easier to understand. How are we supposed to understand the conclusion of the text, saying:

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¹ “Puppet strings, as a rhizome or multiplicity, are tied not to the supposed will of an artist or puppeteer but to a multiplicity of nerve fibers, which form another puppet in other dimensions connected to the first” (1987: 8).

We can see the degree to which contemplation becomes darker and weaker in the organic world, so that the grace that is there emerges all the more shining and triumphant. Just as the intersection of two lines from the same side of a point after passing through the infinite suddenly finds itself again on the other side – or as the image from a concave mirror, after having gone off into the infinite, suddenly appears before us again – so grace returns after knowledge has gone through the world of the infinite, in that it appears to best advantage in that human bodily structure that has no consciousness at all – or has infinite consciousness—that is, in the mechanical puppet, or in the God. (Kleist 1972: 26)

Deleuze’s comments on marionettes can help us understand both the meaning of Kleist’s mechanical grace and how subjects of dramatization are designed. Puppets, mechanical dolls or automatons must not be approached according to their resemblance to human figures, but instead we must approach them by following the lines they draw into space. If the more normalized lines are the ones along which moments of the story are imitated through mechanical curves and gestures, we should never forget that these lines only exist as they are articulated to another line. This other line is an abstract, non-figurative, and non-symbolic one: it is the vertical line along which the puppeteer makes the puppet’s center of gravity – which would better be described as a center of levity—displace, regardless of what the puppet should represent. Never shall we find any binary relationship between this abstract line and the concrete movements of the puppet (Deleuze 2006: 11). This is a line of flight, which flies away from representation and from the gravity of matter, becoming pure determination of forces, pure spatiotemporal dynamism. That is why, according to Kleist’s text, only a god can equal a puppet’s grace, but the best human dancer cannot.

The echoes between marionettes’ grace and dramatizing subjects bring into light an important component of the dramatization process: in the special kind of grace which dramatization shapes it is difficult not to see a certain idea of freedom. And indeed, flying along the abstract line is freedom to Deleuze, who considers Kleist as one of the first writers showing us how to escape the condition of a private, psychological subject expressing feelings in favor of a radical plane of exteriority through which affects make us more than we make them (1987: 356). As Deleuze and Guattari write, “Kleist offers a wonderful explanation of how forms and persons are only appearances produced by the displacement of a center of gravity on an abstract line” (268).

Such a conception of freedom as a negation of a sovereign, subjective interiority is quite disturbing for much of modern philosophy. Hence it should not be surprising that Deleuze uses the automaton pattern to describe Leibnizian monads’ paradoxical freedom in the “most possibly harmonious” universe calculated by God. Deleuze argues that we need to think of the monads as dancing automatons (1993: 68). Of course, God foresees which acts will be those of a monad, but these acts still result from the monad’s inclinations in the present, that is to say from the way the monad is
inclined to displace itself along an abstract line of gravity/levity. The monads’ freedom is schizophrenic but it is still freedom; monads express their singularities through Baroque dance:

There we have an entire “pathos of distance,” like the indivisible distance between two monads (space); the meeting between the two of them becomes a parade, or development, of their respective spontaneities insofar as their distance is upheld; actions and reactions give way to a concatenation of postures allotted now and again through distance (Mannerism). (1993: 68-69)

At this point, we have to remember that the very constituents of dramatization are spatiotemporal dynamisms. The Mannerism, postures and pathos of monads’ Baroque ballet are spatial dynamisms which differentiate them. They even give us the formula of what a free individuation through spatial dynamisms would be. Monads’ postures and manners – not to speak of their pathos of distance – are not the expression of a sovereign self, but they are a singular, immanent composition of external affects. Think of the way A Thousand Plateaus describe the formation of an animal’s territory through an assemblage of heterogeneous components: territory and animals they define are first a matter of critical distances between beings, in such a way that the ethos is a question of Mannerism, of a whole art of poses, postures, silhouettes, steps, and voices (1987: 320).

We now know how the subjects of dramatization differentiate themselves through a Mannerist ballet. It is worth noticing that this ballet of automata does not only define a schizophrenic freedom, but also elaborates a way of thinking truly. Thinking, Deleuze constantly argues through his books, is reaching the impossibility of thinking that is the powerless core of any thought (see for example 1994: 165 and 1989: 165). When developing this idea about the way modern cinema shapes a specific way of thinking, Deleuze thus still uses the figure of a spiritual automaton that cinema raises in its viewers. This spiritual automaton is a pure seer who sees better and further than he can react and think (1989: 170), that is to say a “dismantled, paralyzed, petrified, frozen” Mummy (166), a “mechanical man”, an “experimental dummy” (169). Should we be surprised that cinema’s spiritual automaton leads Deleuze to quote Kleist again, saying that “as in Kleist, or Japanese theatre, the soul is made from the ‘mechanical movement’ of the puppet” (268)?

At this point, we have a whole panorama of how spatial dynamisms determine their subjects, with a specific ethos of manners and distances and an original design of what it means to think. But dramatization is also made of temporal dynamisms. The time-image’s spiritual automaton is obviously defined by time too: the mechanical man is the one stuck in a state of present. But this present must not be considered as a trap: it is an occasion of freedom, and of attaining high zones of the power(less)ness of thinking. This present, which is also the present of dramatization, is better understood through The Logics of Sense. In this last step of our journey into Deleuze’s marionettes
theatre, now the puppet is to be conceived as a mime. In *The Logics of Sense*, Deleuze defends a Stoic conception of freedom: we have to be actors, mimes of what effectively occurs (1990: 161).

To do that, the actor-mime must not represent a character: his/her role is a theme “constituted by the components of the event, that is, by the communicating singularities effectively liberated from the limits of individuals and persons” (150). The mime is Stoic because s/he wants what occurs. Though Stoicism is not equated with passivity. By making the event intensively present, the mime develops a whole ethics of representation and selection of what occurs, of what is worth occurring: becoming the mime of our own events means disengaging an abstract line from the original event (147). If we now look at the temporality of this theatre of mimes, we find the actor as an “anti-god”. God’s time is Chronos: the divine present is the whole of time, where past and future only depends on the perspective we adopt on a segment of time. On the contrary, the actor belongs to Aion, time of the thinnest present. In Aion, the mime represents an instant which is always already past and still in the future. The whole mime’s body is devoted to making this instant consistent, by dividing the instant again and again in order to open him/herself to the impersonal and preindividual role (150). Aion, time of the instantaneous present, is also the time of creativity, of dramatization – the time of a logics of sense and of ethics in the making.

At the beginning of this paper, I asked how subjects of dramatization could concern our thought, and our ethics of thought, as they are unlike any kind of anthropological figure. The answer is clear now: it is because the subjects of dramatization are non-anthropological that they show us the way to a dramatic ethics of thinking. The marionette – puppet, dummy, mime, mummy, automaton – may not seem free when it is stuck in a story showed at a representative level, but it definitely is free to develop its grace through its abstract line of gravity/levity. The timeless fascination humans have for these fake, automatic humans could thus result from the impersonal plane of creativity in Aion that marionettes suggest. Marionettes’ manners tell us about the time and space of dramatization, and about the grace that dramatic cruelty carries. On their abstract lines, marionettes develop an impersonal ethics of thought, but this impersonality teaches us a great deal about the freedom we have to effectuate the events which occur to us. In this sense, ethics in Deleuze is dramatic: “Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not be unworthy of what happens to us” (1990: 149).

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References


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God is Dead: Dramatization, Theatre, and Kantian Schematism

Deleuze describes the method of dramatization through various avenues in both *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze takes the method, within some modifications, from Nietzsche’s body of works. Affirmatively, we can say that the method of dramatization governs inquiry and is pluralist and immanent. It is the fact that it is pluralist and immanent that allows, Deleuze writes, “this investigation [to] find the scientific rule that constitutes it as a semeiology and an axiology, enabling it to determine the sense and value of a word” (NP 119). Indeed, Deleuze maintains that “according to Nietzsche’s method the concept of truth must be dramatized” (NP 95). Thus the method of dramatization allows us to properly investigate signs and symbols and their use or interpretation. It offers us an axiology, a philosophical study of value as either the collective term for ethics and aesthetics or the foundation for these fields. We can see from Leonard Lawlor’s piece on dramatization that ethics and aesthetics are precisely the concern for Deleuzean dramatization. I would like to say that it is the foundation for these fields. Additionally, what I would like to do in this short presentation is discuss some peripheral comments that Deleuze makes about theatre and the method of dramatization in both *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. My goal is to synthesize these comments in order to bring something new to the well known, indeed all too well known, Nietzschean declaration: ‘God is dead.’ I think Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche as a philosopher of theatre and dramatization can, in fact, give us more insight into what is meant by this statement as well as what Deleuze means by the method of dramatization. For, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze states that ‘God
is dead’ is the dramatic proposition par excellence. He maintains this because this statement allows time and movement to enter into the stable and atemporal concept of God. In these early texts, Deleuze valorizes Nietzsche for putting “metaphysics in motion, in action” (DR 7). In doing so, he believes metaphysics is able to carry out immediate acts based in the singularity of the specific spatio-temporal moment rather than mediate acts based in a legal, moral, or rational law. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze tells us that above all, “it is a question of producing… a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate representations (DR 7-8). Thus, every concept, God, self, person, human, man, woman, or otherwise (as well as their possibilities), must be understood as the result of what Deleuze calls spatio-temporal dynamisms that dramatize and actualize the Idea. It is through the dramatization and actualization of Ideas that verily new paths for these concepts can be created.

Deleuze describes the dramatic proposition as “synthetic, [and] therefore essentially pluralist, typological and differential” (NP 152). Deleuze is not interpreting God or the statement “God is dead” from the point of view of its form. In other words, the idea and statement is not about existence or non-existence and thus it is not judged on the basis of whether the idea of God’s existence or non-existence results in a contradiction. Instead, “God is dead” depends on a synthesis. The phrase synthesizes the idea of God with time and therefore with a relative determination of space and time.¹ This new position does not seek an absolute determination of opposing existence and non-existence. The idea of God

¹ I would say, while space and time are often mentioned separately, they should not be absolutely separated when we are speaking of the method of dramatization and therefore death entering into a concept.
can no longer be absolute because “God [as with Reason] cannot be made the object of synthetic knowledge without death entering into him” (NP 152). Thinking through objects, events, with the method of dramatization, escapes the absolute dichotomy of existence and non-existence in favor of the relative determination of the difference between life and death, the determination of what perspective a problem is interpreted. It is this very general but crucial point of bringing death into life that allows “God is dead” to be the dramatic proposition par excellence. From Deleuze’s description, “God existed and he is dead and he will rise from the dead, God has become Man and Man has become God,” we can see that it is no longer a matter of God existing absolutely, but a question of from what spatio-temporal perspective we can interpret the concept. At what historical interpretation does the concept become relevant, at what point is it irrelevant? These are the dynamics that govern inquiry when interpreting and creating concepts.

Insofar as Deleuze connects dramatization to thinking, Deleuze gets the radical position of giving the capacity of thought to all things from Nietzsche as well. Thus an indispensable aspect of the method of dramatization is removing the anthropological character from the forces that generate thought. In fact, because reactive forces constitute man, “the whole method of dramatization aims to discover other types expressing other relations of forces, to discover another quality of the will to power capable of transmuting its too-human nuances” (NP 79). Deleuze continues “according to Nietzsche the inhuman and the superhuman – a thing, an animal or a god – are no less capable of dramatization than a man or his determinations” (NP 79). As it indicates pre-individual forces at work

I think this offers a fruitful point of contact between Deleuze and Foucault. A point at which we can refer back to chapter nine of Foucault’s 1966 text, The Order of Things. It id in the ‘Age of Anthropology’ that man takes the place of God. Thus to locate this method in the human is as problematic as interpreting the Idea of God from the point of view of form.
“the method of dramatization surpasses man on every side” (NP 79). It is because the concept of man is a representation and the type of thought that runs through the concept of man is representational that human thought cannot found the method of dramatization. Human thought, then, cannot ground the interpretation of signs and ethics and aesthetics themselves, either.

Within pages of the introduction of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze discusses the importance of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Peguy for seeking anti-representational thought, opposing them all to Hegel. Deleuze first opposes their interpretation and presentation of theatre to that of Hegel’s. For Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Peguy, “theatre is real movement, and it extracts real movement from all the arts it employs. This is what we are told: this movement, the essence and the interiority of movement, is not opposition, not mediation, but repetition.” According to Deleuze, Hegel prioritizes “the abstract relation of the particular to the concept in general” over “the true relation of the singular and the universal in the Idea” (DR 9). What this means is that any singularity within the particular is reduced and subsumed under the concept. The repetition of the instance of the particular is the very same as the generality of the concept. Moreover, by abstract, the concept is given a trans-temporal and spatial ‘Truth’. Thus, if the form of the particular does not correspond to the logic of the concept, there is no value to the particular, its existence is either impossible or irrelevant.³ Hegel offers no movement outside of the laws of nature and of rationality. He merely “proposes an abstract movement of concepts instead of a movement of the Physis and the Psyche… and thus remains in the reflected element of ‘representation’, within simple generality. He

³ These two things are not mutually exclusive, especially if we are thinking of the value of the particular at the political level.
represents concepts instead of dramatizing Ideas: he creates false theatre, a false drama, a false movement” (DR 9).

While theatre and drama, repetition and difference, cannot be separated, Deleuze consistently describes theatre as though it leans toward the side of repetition and describes drama as on the side of difference. “Movement,” he says “is repetition and… this is our true theatre” (DR 9). By this he means that repetition is understood through “theatrical space, the emptiness of that space, and the manner in which it is filled and determined by the signs and masks through which the actor plays a role which plays other roles” (DR 9). In short, the actor fills up the space of a role which is always in relation to other roles and a distinctive point in relation to several historical access points. What is integral, however, is that movement is enacted without mediation, without intermediary. This capacity for immediacy is precisely what opposes the theatre of repetition and the theatre of representation. In the theatre of repetition, “we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as a ‘terrible power’” (DR 9-10 my emphasis).

Explaining what produces movement, Deleuze defines Nietzsche’s eternal return as movement endowed with a force. Indeed, repetition is grounded in the eternal return on the basis of “both the death of God and the dissolution of the self” (DR 10). As is well known, the death of God and the dissolution of the self are the requirements for force to select, to destroy and produce rather than reiterating the return of the Same in general, the

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4 As mentioned above, it is impossible to speak of space without time.
false, abstract, logical and mediated movement of Hegel. Without the self and God as mediating steps, as recourses to already represented concepts, “the form of repetition in the eternal return is the brutal form of the immediate, that of the universal and the singular reunited, which dethrones every general law, dissolves the mediations and annihilates the particulars subjected to the law” (DR 10 my emphasis). Deleuze identifies, here, a ‘formalism’ which goes beyond Kantian formalism, beyond the repetition of a rational moral law, for instance. He identifies an ethics occurring from a repetition, a test, and a ground “itself the only form of a law beyond morality” (DR 10). It is the point of a suspension, a thought that is beyond good and evil. Hence, repetition, which produces difference (both of which are bound up in the process of dramatization) is identified with Being but Being insofar as this being is opposed to “every legal form, to the being-similar as much as to the being-equal” (DR 10). Only there do we find the immediate identity of the singular. And it is in Deleuze’s fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition where he will discuss this inequality as the sufficient reason for the ground of the dramatization of Ideas.5

Instead of a theatre of the thing represented, a theatre of the particular subsumed under concepts, Deleuze proposes the dramatization of Ideas. The dramatization of Ideas is generated by “a theatre of problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious, the final elements of which remain the problems themselves”6 (DR 192).

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5 I will not be going into inequality/disparity as the sufficient reason for Ideas directly in this presentation. 
6 Notice Deleuze says an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious and not of consciousness. Consciousness would refer back to recognition and the theatre of repetition. Also, as an apprenticeship, this theatre of repetition and method of dramatization is associated with learning. Indeed, Deleuze speaks of learning earlier in the paragraph from which this quotation is lifted. It is a matter of learning and bringing something new to consciousness. Not a matter of memorization and recognition.
The Idea, for Deleuze as for Kant, is beyond the concept but still an element of (pre-individual) thought. And, it is the movement of theatrical repetition which produces “internal differences which dramatize an Idea before representing an object” (DR 216). And, of course, “Difference here is internal to an Idea, even though it be external to the concept which represents an object” (DR 216).

Deleuze identifies the dramatization of the Idea with dynamic spatio-temporal processes. These dynamic processes determine the actualization of Ideas because they are dramatized, because they dramatize the Idea. They “create or trace a space [and time] corresponding to the differential relation and to the singularities to be actualized” (DR 216). To clarify what he means by spatio-temporal determinations, Deleuze refers to Kant. These spatio-temporal determinations are akin to what Kant called schemata, but with one important difference. Like spatio-temporal dynamisms, as we know, “a schema is indeed a rule of determination for time and of construction for space,” however, in Kant a schema only works in relation to concepts and the logical possibility of those concepts. Again, while the schema constructs space and time, Kant forces it to be determined by logical possibility, interpreted from the view of form, dismissed if it forms a contradiction.⁷ Deleuze explains “this is so much part of its nature that it does no more than convert logical possibility into transcendental possibility. It brings spatio-temporal relations into correspondence with the logical relations of the concept” (DR 218). In other words, Kant uses the schema to instantiate one guiding conceptual rule for the determination of time and the construction of space at the transcendental level. But at the same time, Deleuze notes that Kant describes the schema as residing external to the

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⁷ This is one reason Deleuze will oppose Kant’s logic of conditions of possibility to a transcendental empiricism which seeks to account for genesis of real experience undetermined by logical possibility.
concepts. Insofar as it lies external to the concept, how, Deleuze asks, is it that Kant ensures “its own harmony with the understanding without appeal to a miracle” (DR 218)? The answer is that the schematism possesses the power to “divide a concept and specify it according to a typology” (DR 218). Without a schematism, concepts are incapable of specifying its point of view or dividing itself. With a schematism, spatio-temporal dynamisms can reveal difference and typology within a concept. Thus, for Deleuze we must make the Kantian schematism plural. Plural schematisms would act as “agents of differenciation” which “are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath it, like a hidden art” (DR 218). And it is with this pluralization of Kantian schemata that Deleuze removes their mediated association with concepts and rather determines their immediate and primary role as dynamisms - dramatizations of Ideas. In contact with the Idea, spatio-temporal dynamisms create new concepts for thought, they bring to life the differential relations and singularities of the Idea.

Deleuze explains:

“For if the dynamism is external to concepts – and, as such, a schema – it is internal to Ideas – and, as such, a drama or dream. Species are divided into lineages, Linnaeons into Jordanons, concepts into types, but these divisions do not have the same criteria as the divided, they are not homogeneous with the divided, and they are established in a domain external to that of concepts but internal to that of the Ideas which preside over division itself. Dynamism thus comprises its own power of determining space and time, since it immediately incarnates the differential relations, the singularities and the progressivities immanent in the Idea. The shortest is not simply the schema of the concept of straight, but the dream, the drama or the dramatization of the Idea of a line insofar as it expresses the differenciation of the straight from the curved. We distinguish Ideas, concepts and dramas: the role of dramas is to specify concepts by incarnating the differential relations and singularities of an Idea” (DR 218 my emphasis).

In conclusion, what can we say about the method of dramatization from Deleuze’s descriptions of theatre, repetition, and Kantian schematism? It is a matter of making concepts plural and immanent – our two guiding affirmative statements above. Or, rather, it is a matter of allowing death to enter a given concept in order for that which is singular
to break free of subsumption under conceptual generalities and engender a new thought. It is evidently important that time (and space) be understood dynamically and as a point of view in and of itself. It is not linear time that can kill God and resurrect him over and over again. It is only a heterogeneous time and space that can account for truth that is based in pluralism. At the same time, however, this heterogeneous space and time is not truthless. For Deleuze, immanence always accompanies pluralism. Insofar as immanence accompanies pluralism, the selection and valuing of a singularity is most poignant when its being is one that allows for its death in order to affect new thought. In other words, the very power of singularity is the power of dramatization, not the power to solidify into an atemporal concept. It is necessary, then, that death enter into the concept of God, man, self, human, woman, in order to engender life. It is only the incessant synthesis of death into conceptual laws that we can carve an avenue to a more ethical life. In that sense, the method of dramatization is the foundation for ethics and aesthetics.